

SECRET *ADP*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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DATE: August 15, 1962

TO : ARA - Mr. Martin

FROM : ARA - Robert A. Hurwitch *RAH*SUBJECT: Observations on Operational Potential with respect  
to Cuba

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize my impressions gained from discussions in the Operations Group of what we can reasonably expect might be accomplished covertly in Cuba under Course B or any other course which is conditioned upon a comparatively low noise level.

Propaganda Media

Radio to date has proved of limited value. Short-wave does not reach many people because of shortage of receivers. Medium-wave broadcasting from Swan Island has a small audience, due in part to the low power of the facility. CIA recommends that these broadcasts cease. USIA and we prefer that they continue. None feel that the investment entailed in a more powerful facility would be justified. Enlargement of the Swan Island facility or establishment of a new powerful facility elsewhere would, of course, attract a great deal of attention. [

(b)(1)  
(a)(1) DDD

Dissemination of propaganda to Cuba through the open mails is underway and will probably improve, unless the Cuban Government's censorship tightens.

materiel

Infiltration of Cubans with some propaganda is accomplished, although the maritime operations appear to be increasingly difficult. I have inquired about the possibility of infiltrating small portable presses for underground publications - CIA says that they are looking into this possibility.

(b)(1)  
(a)(4) CIAConclusion

Our means of communicating with the Cuban people are limited and will probably remain so.

Sabotage

The limited state of communications directly affects the success of sabotage operations. [

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B1  
AS

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(b)(1)  
(u)(4)+(5)

Air and Sea Support of Infiltrated Teams

While maritime means, including the use of submarines if necessary, would continue to be the primary means of infiltration/exfiltration/re-supply, occasions may arise where re-supply can only be accomplished effectively by air and with U.S. citizen crews. Teams that have moved inland may find that only with considerable danger can they reach the coast again for re-supply. Agency experience with Cuban pilots on air re-supply missions has not been good (they are not accurate) and U.S. citizen personnel may have to be used.

ARA:RAHurwitch:dr

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